Global Investment Outlook
The economic portion of our latest quarterly Global Investment Outlook can be found here: Tariff threats in focus.
Reviewing and previewing tariffs
For once, the last few weeks have brought little additional news or actions on the U.S. tariff file. This provides a welcome opportunity to take a breath, reviewing what we have learned and previewing what could come on April 2.
General themes
The first and indeed main tariff theme has been that the direction of travel is toward bigger and broader tariffs relative to what the consensus expectation was going into the second Trump term. Certainly, the dangers are considerably higher than they were during the first Trump term. The steel and aluminum tariffs – at 25% each – are already larger than the ones imposed in 2018.
The second tariff theme is that prospective economic damage is already coming into view before a large swath of the tariffs have even been delivered. Policy uncertainty is obviously very high. Consumer, market and business confidence have all been hit quite badly, signaling the loss of the animal spirits that had so promisingly congealed shortly after the election.
Consumer confidence has already fully reversed the initial burst of enthusiasm that expressed itself in the months after the election. The stock market has also visibly fretted, with the S&P 500 down 7% from its peak and as much as 10% lower at its worst point.
Business confidence is also waning. Corporate references to tariffs have surged and are back to the highs achieved during the first Trump term (see next chart). Even more distressingly, U.S. CEO confidence has plummeted in unprecedented fashion (see subsequent chart). It is even worse than it was during the inflation spike of 2022, far worse than during the pandemic, and indeed the worst going back to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.
Tariff concerns surged as in the 2018-2019 U.S.-China trade war
U.S. CEO confidence dropped sharply on Trump policies
In contrast, small business confidence has not declined as sharply, and remains well above pre-election levels (see next chart). Helping to explain this deviation, some small businesses stand to benefit from greater protectionism as foreign competitors are constrained. Also, the metric has long shown what appears to be a strong partisan tendency, with Republican presidents favoured over Democrats regardless of the actual health of the economy. It is hard to fathom the giant gap between (optimistic) expectations and (muted) current conditions will persist unless the economy defies expectations and accelerates sharply from here (see next chart).
Small business optimism wanes as policy uncertainty prevails
Small businesses still feeling very optimistic despite some reversal
The third tariff theme is the surprising tolerance for economic and financial market pain demonstrated by the White House. It was a central tenet that some of the more growth-negative policies on the Trump platform would be tempered by the desire for a strong economy and strong markets. However, this has simply not been the case so far. We still imagine there are limits to this tolerance, but they are somewhat more distant than first envisioned.
This White House attitude is being framed as one of tolerating short-term pain in exchange for long-term gain. And there could be some long-term gain given that the onshoring of production to the U.S. will likely increase after recent tariff volatility, whether the tariffs fully persist or not. But it remains far from clear that the economic damage inflicted by the tariffs and the reputational damage to the U.S. won’t overwhelm that benefit.
Furthermore, it remains the case that the U.S. economy is already operating in the vicinity of its production capacity. The addition of further manufacturing output necessitates the loss of output somewhere else given a limited supply of labour and capital. To the extent the U.S. is naturally better at doing what it has already been doing – by virtue of the fact that it doesn’t require trade barriers to compete in those sectors – this may not constitute a very attractive tradeoff. If the thought is that the U.S. can shed its lowest productivity jobs, upgrading them to higher productivity manufacturing, the unfortunate reality is that many of the lowest productivity jobs in the economy – food services, tourism, retail sales – cannot be outsourced. They have to be done by someone physically in the U.S.
April 2nd looms
President Trump has called the April 2nd tariff deadline ‘the big one,’ and we are assuming that the date will indeed reveal much of what remains on the tariff file. With the caveat that uncertainty is so high that many outcomes are plausible, our base-case forecast is for fairly large tariffs to be implemented on or shortly after April 2, with the hope that these will then be scaled back within six months after successful negotiations.
In theory, the 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico will be re-applied on April 2, and a range of tariffs will be implemented or at least threatened on major trading partners that the U.S. recently called “The Dirty 15.” One imagines that these countries could include Canada, Mexico, China, the European Union (EU), the UK, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, India, Taiwan, Thailand and Brazil, among others.
What do betting markets have to say on the subject? It can be hard to get a clear reading given the way the questions are posed. For instance, Polymarket assigns just a 35% chance that tariffs on Canada rise by May, but the devil is in the details: the current tariff rate on Canada is defined as being a blanket 25% rate (so any resumption of that tariff on April 2 doesn’t count), and any new tariff that applies to all countries – say, a sector-oriented tariff like those already in place on steel and aluminum – would not count as being a new tariff exclusively on Canada. So, essentially, the question is asking whether Canada gets a higher than 25% tariff rate. We’d still be tempted to vote “yes” given the very real prospect of a larger tariff on Canada’s dairy sector (reportedly, up to 250%).
Another Polymarket question assigns just a 37% probability of blanket tariffs against the EU by June 30. But that still leaves the possibility of significant tariffs that fall just short of being blanket in nature – such as excluding a small handful of sectors – or the possibility that the U.S. applies tariffs on European countries on a country-by-country basis rather than as a bloc.
If there has been any good news on the tariff file recently, it was on March 24 when reports indicated that any reciprocal tariffs directed toward the auto sector and computer chips would be delayed past April 2. As such, one might say that tariffs are being implemented in a phased fashion, with steel and aluminum on March 12, a wide range of products on April 2, and then autos and chips at a later date.
Much will be learned in the coming weeks. April 2 will, of course, reveal just how large this next round of tariffs will be, what sectors and countries are targeted, and the nature of U.S. demands. More will likely be learned over the subsequent few weeks regarding how flexible the U.S. is in its demands, as some of the asks – mainly relating to sales taxes, currency valuations and protected strategic service sectors – may be difficult for other countries to oblige.
This presumes no deal is struck before these pending tariffs are applied. During Trump’s first term, it took 14 months for Canada and Mexico to strike a deal with the U.S., and longer for deals to be struck with Japan and the EU. As such, it would be an impressive display of speed if significant deals were struck in the coming weeks. In turn, we may continue to learn more over time.
Retaliatory strategies
The targeted countries are responding in different ways to U.S. tariffs.
The cautious approach is to remain quiet and do little in the short run, letting other countries be in the crosshairs of Trump’s ire and hoping that quiet negotiations will suffice. The UK, Japan and South Korea very much fit in this category, though in fairness they have only been affected in a minor way so far.
The bold approach is to punch back with immediate tariffs on the U.S., establishing that there are consequences for U.S. tariffs. The damage to the U.S. economy is greater with this approach, though it is also greater for the targeted country. This approach further allows for negotiations in which both parties have something to offer in the form of reduced tariffs.
Canada has been perhaps the most aggressive responder, imposing two sets of tariffs on the U.S. that now total C$60 billion, with an additional tranche planned. Canada took a similar approach during Trump’s first term, with a fairly constructive ending in the form of a new trade deal and no substantial tariffs. Canada also has what is arguably a political motivation – an election looms and tariffs on the U.S. are highly popular with the public. China has also responded firmly to U.S. tariffs.
Landing somewhere in the middle, Mexico has announced plans for tariffs, but is not detailing the timing or specifics. The EU has announced specific tariffs on the U.S., but then delayed their implementation until mid-April.
Only time will tell which approach is superior. There is definitely some danger in the Canadian and Chinese approach, though this is not to say it won’t work. One might posit that the aggressive countries are doing a service for the less aggressive countries, shielding them and also creating enough economic pain in the U.S. to render tariffs unpopular.
Tariffs and the economy
We continue to believe that tariff damage is unlikely to be too painful for most countries as the great majority just don’t trade intensively enough with the U.S. But for Canada and Mexico, the pain could be quite large, and it could be significant for the U.S. as well.
The risk of recession certainly rises with significant tariffs. But for the U.S., we still peg it well below a 50% chance – more like a 25%-plus chance in our base-case tariff scenario. That’s well up from the odds of a few quarters ago, but still well shy of the most likely outcome.
All told, we have chopped just over half a percentage point from the U.S. 2025 gross domestic product (GDP) growth forecast in response to larger expected tariffs. We’ve dropped it to just 1.9% growth – the slowest clip since 2020 (see next chart).
The Canadian outlook has been downgraded even more sharply, to just 0.9% growth. That includes an assumption of declining economic output for a quarter due to the combination of uncertainty plus tariffs before negotiations make sufficient headway to pare tariffs and deliver a later partial economic rebound. For Canada, the risk of recession is well over 50% if large tariffs are applied enduringly, and not far from 50% even if the large tariffs only last a quarter or two. The growth downgrades in other countries are broadly smaller, and some also reflect an underwhelming growth handoff that predates the tariff threat. While the consensus growth outlook is also in decline, our forecasts are now somewhat more conservative than the consensus.
2025 GDP outlook for developed markets varies
Lingering tariffs
A source of uncertainty in Canada has been the extent to which the 25% tariffs applied on March 4 were truly lifted on March 6. Technically, the letter of the law was that the 25% tariffs were lifted only for products that qualify under the USMCA (United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement). It came as quite a surprise to learn that just 38% of what Canada sold to the U.S. in 2024 relied upon the USMCA trade deal, with another 40% entering via other duty-free programs, and a further 22% entering the U.S. subject to duties. In theory, then, 62% of what Canada sells to the U.S. is still subject to the 25% tariffs.
What was strange about this was that there wasn’t more screaming by Canadian exporters. This made us suspect that most exporters were not actually paying such high tariffs.
The answer and confirmation of this suspicion appears to be that many of the Canadian exports were theoretically eligible under the USMCA trade deal, but it just didn’t make sense under normal circumstances for businesses to go through the logistical headache of officially establishing the origin of every component in their product, or of filling out the associated paperwork if the payoff was the avoidance of a tiny tariff, if that. But now that the payoff is avoiding a big 25% tariff, it makes a lot more sense to secure USMCA status. In turn, many businesses – most visibly, in the energy sector – have been filling out a great deal of paperwork recently, massively reducing the number of products affected by the lingering 25% tariffs.
Do boycotts have an effect?
A number of countries – most prominently and consequentially, Canada – are attempting to boycott U.S. products in retaliation for the imposition of tariffs. At its essence, a boycott occurs when consumers are making their spending decisions through a political lens rather than simply evaluating the relative cost, quality and healthy/safety/environmental factors.
Of course, unlike with tariffs or embargos, boycotts are entirely voluntary and so not all consumers engage in them. How effective are they? An academic study by Heilamm (2015) examining four different national-level boycotts within the past two decades, including the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods in 2012, found an average one-year trade disruption ranging between about 2% and 20% of the usual flow of trade.
Boycotts also tend to peter out over time, rendering them most powerful over the initial months and quarters, and then declining as outrage fades and attention turns elsewhere over time. Frequently, there is also catch-up spending at a later date to make up for earlier deprivation.
Thus, boycotts are highly porous, fairly temporary and highly variable in their effect. Nevertheless, were a country like Canada to manage a 5% reduction in U.S. purchases, that would amount to about US$17 billion in reduced demand – a non-trivial sum in absolute dollar terms, though less than 0.1% of U.S. annual economic output.
It is clear that Canadians are boycotting U.S. tourism to an extent greater than the 5% figure speculated, above. In February, Canadian resident return trips from the U.S. fell by 23% relative to the same month in 2024, and Flight Centre estimates a 40% decline in Canadian leisure travel bookings to the U.S. over the same time frame. A February 2025 Ipsos poll shows 65% of Canadians plan to avoid going to the U.S. But, of course, there are other U.S. exports for which demand is less elastic, and so the overall decline in consumption of U.S. products is unlikely to be nearly so great as these figures.
Canadian trade war relief
The Canadian government is now working to minimize the damage from tariffs. The Bank of Canada already cut its policy rate by 25bps to 2.75%, though there is a fair chance it would have eased even without the prospect of tariffs. Still, one might think that large tariffs on Canada would prompt a reduction in the policy rate to below 2%, while smaller tariffs might leave the policy rate in the mid-twos.
Fiscal action is also occurring, even without a sitting parliament. Eligibility for employment insurance will increase with the waiving of the usual one-week waiting period.
What appears to be a reimbursement process is being set up to provide relief from import tariffs for Canadian companies that do not have the option of buying certain goods from non-U.S. markets.
There are also a number of liquidity-oriented supports. One lets companies defer their tax payments and sales tax remittances for a period of time. Another creates a new subsidized financing facility for struggling businesses, and to encourage the access of new markets.
These programs could, of course, change if the upcoming election yields a change of government. In the meantime, Canada’s budget deficit is set to expand and a portion of the anticipated economic hole will be filled by additional government spending. Fortunately, the country’s deficit is fairly tame relative to many of its peers, leaving some room for action.
Economic data flow
The feared U.S. government shutdown was averted on March 14 with the assistance of a handful of Democratic Party votes. This funds the federal government through the end of the fiscal year on September 30.
In more traditional economic data, the theme for the U.S. remains that of economic deceleration rather than collapse. U.S. confidence metrics are certainly sharply lower, but actual activity metrics only show a slight deceleration. As an example, the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) Manufacturing and Services indices both continue to rest just above the critical 50 threshold separating growth from decline.
Retail sales were up a mere 0.2% after a large decline in the prior month, but the combination of rising employment and fairly robust wage gains is likely to prevent too much consumer trouble in the near term.
The Citi Economic Surprise Index for the U.S. has stabilized at a slightly negative level – not great, but not too bad, and certainly not indictive of economic collapse.
The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s GDPNow tracker continues to predict declining output in the first quarter of the year. However, we still believe it is identifying tariff-related frontloading of imports (a negative for GDP) without managing to capture the placement of those imports into inventories (a positive for GDP). GDP growth is indeed set to be weaker than normal in the first quarter of 2025, but on the order of 1% annualized growth rather than a sharp decline.
The U.S. Federal Reserve downgraded its growth outlook, but ultimately decided to keep the fed funds rate unchanged at 4.25—4.50%.
More broadly, the U.S. short-term economic exceptionalism story continues to fade. U.S. growth has slackened, while growth in a number of major developed markets has increased or is at least holding steady. The U.S. is still likely to be the fastest growing economy among major peers in 2025, but the advantage should be much smaller than the massive lead sustained in 2023 and 2024.
A history of government spending cuts
As the U.S. seeks US$2 trillion in spending cuts, and in light of an enormous U.S. fiscal deficit and rather large deficits in quite a number of other markets, it is worth reviewing the modern history of developed-world government spending cuts.
The short answer is that spending cuts will be hard to deliver at a time of rising debt-servicing costs, rising military budgets and tariff-induced economic weakness. While tariffs do generate government revenues themselves, this does not count as a spending cut – the focus of this investigation – and for that matter much of the additional government revenue likely bleeds away via lower revenues elsewhere due to the aforementioned economic damage.
Let us start with nominal government spending – that is, the total amount of money a government spends on goods and services, without adjusting for inflation or changes in the value of money. In practice, there have not been many episodes of nominal government spending declining outright in recent decades (see next chart). Spending did fall briefly after the pandemic, but only because it grew so massively during the pandemic. It also did so briefly in some countries after the Global Financial Crisis, but again largely because spending spiked during the crisis and then fell back down. There are a few other exceptions, but they are small and rarely sustained.
Nominal government spending almost never declines outright
What about inflation-adjusted government spending? The difference, of course, is that with real spending, you merely have to keep your nominal spending rising by less than the rate of inflation to make downward progress. There are absolutely more examples of this (see next chart). But it is still fairly rare to see large declines, and the exceptions are countries like Italy and Spain that had serious debt crises and so engaged in extremely painful austerity across the 2010s. And they still only barely managed to reduce their real government spending.
Persistent upward trajectory in real government spending continues
The most tried-and-true spending-side solution for government excesses is to allow government spending to grow, but at a slower rate than the nominal economy grows (see next chart). ‘Nominal’ here refers to an economy measured at current prices, without accounting for inflation or deflation.
Government spending as share of GDP can decline gradually
Among prominent success stories via this metric, Canada managed to cut its government spending as a share of GDP by a whopping 13 percentage points over 13 years (from 1992 to 2005). That pace – about one percentage point per year – struck a balance between speed and not sacrificing too much economic growth via the austerity.
Another prominent example is Italy, which cut its government spending as a share of GDP by a big 12 percentage points in just seven years (1993 to 2000).
Such spending restraint does not happen easily, nor without careful planning. Canada created a Program Review under former Prime Minister Chretien, which methodically went through departments, evaluating the relative importance of programs and services within the fiscal framework and making cuts accordingly. Privatizations were also an important feature, as they were under Thatcher in the UK in the 1980s. The Clinton administration in the U.S. ran a program in the 1990s called the National Performance Review that managed to extract savings without a sharp decline in service.
But these examples represent the extremes of what can be achieved without suffering too much economic pain. They were achieved in part due to unusually fast economic growth in the 1990s and early 2000s, spurred by the peace dividend during that period as global conflicts ebbed. A fair portion of the improvement stemmed from a natural reduction after high government spending during and after the early-1990s recession.
The improvement since the pandemic has similarly been in large part due to the end of extraordinary government spending rather than any genuine austerity effort.
The conclusion is that as the U.S. seeks cost savings and as a host of countries seek to reduce their budget deficits, it is probably not realistic to look for nominal government spending to actually fall, nor for inflation-adjusted government spending to fall by much. The most realistic approach is just to limit the rate of spending growth so that it runs reliably below that of nominal GDP growth – on the order of perhaps one percentage point per year – and to slowly dig out of the fiscal hole over a period of several years.
Of course, the U.S. doesn’t actually seek to reduce its government deficit by $2 trillion, but instead to use the space created by any spending cuts to deliver tax cuts that will in theory more than eat through those savings. Thus, the U.S. may be some distance off from actually achieving a significantly reduced fiscal deficit, unless economic growth manages to significantly ramp up and save the day.
Chinese public policy
The path ahead for Chinese public policy gained some additional clarity in mid-March after a series of prominent policy meetings. As has been widely reported, China continues to target real GDP growth of around 5% in 2025, and inflation of about 2%. That represents the continuation of the approximate growth rate achieved in 2024, and a return to positive inflation (though ending the country’s current tussle with deflation was not deemed a priority).
Articulating how the government hopes to deliver this growth outcome, the planned federal fiscal deficit is set to rise from approximately 3% of GDP to 4% of GDP – the highest deficit (and thus stimulus) in decades. Among the planned government supports is further money to absorb bad local government debt and the previously announced recapitalization of Chinese banks. Both should allow for a measure of faster growth once these sectors are unencumbered of their current problems.
Chinese policymakers presumably remain in wait-and-see mode to assess the full scope of threatened U.S. tariffs against the country, with the potential to act should these ramp up significantly further.
Of note, the consumer continues to receive a fair amount of government attention. This is understandable given the low level of current consumer confidence (see next chart) and the long-awaited hope that the Chinese consumer would become a major growth engine given the country’s burgeoning middle class. We note that nominal retail sales are rising despite deflation and a shrinking population, so consumer austerity is somewhat overstated. But there is room for faster consumer spending growth, especially if households can be persuaded to stop saving so much.
Chinese consumer sentiment shows small uptick lately though still anemic
The State Council released a special action plan on March 16 to increase consumption. It includes:
Increase the minimum wage.
Stabilize the property and stock markets, where the bulk of household wealth is stored.
Boost the birth rate via baby bonuses and other measures, creating more consumers (indeed, China’s birth rate rose slightly in early 2025 from 2024, though it remains very low).
Strengthen the social safety net so that households don’t feel compelled to save so much, including increasing pension and healthcare payments.
Provide particular support for key service-oriented consumption sectors including childcare and elder care, restaurants, tourism and entertainment.
Extend the government’s consumer goods trade-in-program that encourages consumers to upgrade to more modern products.
Encourage workers to take their holidays and not to work excessive overtime – presumably in an effort to enable leisure time for consumption.
All told, we remain moderate optimists on the Chinese economic outlook relative to market expectations, in part due to this policy support.
Canadian round-up
Canadian election
Three things have happened in the Canadian election.
The election has been officially set for April 28, meaning it is just over a month ahead.
The race has continued to slip from the hands of the Conservative Party. Whereas the Conservatives were leading by well over 20 points at the start of 2025, the race is now quite close and the latest polls actually show the Liberals slightly ahead (see next chart).
Polls, of course, have become less reliable over the years for a variety of reasons, including diminishing response rates. National polls also don’t reflect the distribution of votes, which can be critically important given that it is the accumulation of seats rather than votes that determine the winner in Canada.
Betting market Polymarket assigns barely higher than even odds to a Liberal government (51% and 52% likelihoods, respectively, that Carney is Prime Minister and that the Liberals form the government).
We are inclined to think that the race is close, but the Liberal advantage may be somewhat greater than this. Justifying that assertion, CBC news’ poll tracker estimates that the tiny Liberal advantage in the popular vote could translate into a pretty large election win given the party’s more efficient conversion of votes into seats. The Liberals are currently tracking 177 seats to the Conservatives 132 seats, consistent with a majority government. Recall that the Liberals won the last two elections without capturing the most votes in either.
To be sure it is still a close race and with plenty of room for twists and turns. But it is now arguably the Liberals’ race to lose.
The Canadian election has tightened up
It is not just the polls but also the economic policy divide between the two parties that has tightened. The Liberal Party under Prime Minister Carney has pivoted from the left to the centre of the political spectrum. Both parties now pledge to eliminate the consumer portion of the carbon tax. Both now promise to cancel the stalled capital gains tax hike. Both now talk of cutting the bottom personal income tax bracket. Both now speak about the importance of reducing red tape and increasing infrastructure and investment in major resource projects.
As such, it is not unreasonable to think that, regardless of the election victor, Canadian economic policy will soon find itself on a more supportive path. That said, it is probably still fair to argue that the Conservative platform is more pro-growth than the Liberal one to the extent that many of the aforementioned ideas are set to be implemented more forcefully under a Conservative government. Then again, the Conservative Party talks of balanced budgets, while the refashioned Liberal Party seeks to exclude capital spending from the budget figures in a way that would enable more money to flow from fiscal coffers.
Canada-China relations
The obvious move for Canada since the White House began threatening tariffs is to pivot toward China as a trading partner. This weakens the U.S. bargaining position and theoretically strengthens the Canadian economy. China even spoke of this prospect in March.
However, two complications exist.
It isn’t realistic to think that trade flows can pivot rapidly enough or sufficiently to materially cushion the blow of American tariffs on either country.
Like the U.S., China quite recently increased its tariffs on Canada. New tariffs on Canadian canola and related products were implemented on March 20, in response to Canada’s earlier decision to match U.S. 100% tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles.
Despite the protestations of the Canadian government, China also recently executed four Chinese-Canadian dual citizens after they were convicted of crimes in China.
China’s desire that Canada re-open its resource sector to Chinese acquisitions may also be difficult for the government to stomach.
As such, there may be room for small agreements between the two countries, but a wholesale pivot toward China seems quite unlikely. The lesson once again for Canada is that the country doesn’t have a lot of genuine friends right now, and so should engage in deals that make economic sense on their own merits, not because of any hope for the warming of relations in a broader sense.
Canadian economy
The Canadian economy is beginning to show serious wear from tariff threats and associated uncertainty. Canadian employment rose by a meagre 1,100 positions in February and small business confidence has collapsed (see next chart).
Canadian small business confidence on future conditions at record low
Consumer confidence is also falling, though not quite to the same extremes (see next chart).
Canadian consumer confidence has fallen from its fall 2024 high
True, Canadian economic surprises remain positive, but we believe a portion of this reflects the front-loading of U.S. demand for Canadian products before tariffs set in. Ultimately, the fate of the economy will be set by the size and duration of U.S. tariffs. We believe fairly large tariffs are likely coming in early April, and so budget for a period of contraction. We hope this ends with a reduction of tariffs that prevents an official recession from forming.
On the inflation file, Canadian inflation has been jolted back to an unpleasant reality by the upward leap in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from 1.9% to 2.6% year over year (YoY) in February. This is in significant part due to the end of the two-month sales tax holiday, but it is notable that the inflation rate was not this high before the sales tax came in, suggesting some actual inflation heat has formed.
That may not be the last inflation distortion coming Canada’s way. Higher tariffs naturally threaten to increase the level of prices: all else equal, substantial tariffs could send Canadian annual inflation well into the 3-4% range for a chunk of 2025.
Conversely, the elimination of the consumer-facing carbon tax could reduce inflation by around half a percentage point in fairly short order. However, analysts often look at inflation excluding indirect tax changes, meaning that this could receive less focus from policymakers, even if it has an entirely real effect on the prices faced by consumers.
-With contributions from Vivien Lee, Aaron Ma and Ana Ardila
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